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ABSTRACT 
 
Religious scholars and social science experts frequently differ and sometimes clash when writing 
and discussing issues of ethics. Sometimes unshared understandings on fundamental world-view 
issues is the etiology for these differences.  Differences in defining truth, whether philosophically 
or empirically, often is at the root etiology in these differences.  Practical suggestions are offered 
in order to help scholars of religion and the social sciences better to communicate and collaborate 
in professional and scholarly milieus.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
eligious scholars and social science experts frequently differ and sometimes clash when writing and 
discussing issues of ethics.
1
 This particularly is the case in social science settings where legal 
authorities have taken the issue from theoretical to quite practical and economic realities. For example, 
psychologists, professional counselors, marriage & family therapists, and social workers now have licensure laws 
regulating the practice of professional practice in all or nearly all 50 states. When the social scientists establish laws 
which include codes of ethics that must be followed by all practioners, including those with religious affiliations and 
beliefs, Levicoff 
2
 notes that the stage is set for both philosophical and litigious conflicts. The present article is an 
attempt to analyze where the foundational differences exist between the religious scholars and the social scientist, 
then move toward some reconciliatory suggestions. 
 
I suggest here that persons on both sides of the debate possess significant unshared understandings on 
fundamental world-view issues. Moreover, until progress is made on these fronts—hope for unity on ethical topics is 
dubious. The unshared perspectives exist on two fundamental points. The first relates to defining the construct of 
truth. The second relates to how both sides understand the concept of ethics. 
 
The organizational structure of this article follows. I provide an overview of how both religion and social 
scientists come to understand the construct of truth. Then I proceed to show where the collision occurs as these two 
systems intercept. The topic of truth is addressed since it is the foundational underpinning for ethical understanding. 
Then I provide overviews regarding how religious scholars and social scientists possess differing views on how to 
appropriately understand ethics and where the collision occurs between their two views. The article concludes with 
reconciliatory suggestions. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 R. K. Bullis and C. S. Mazur, Legal Issues and Religious Counseling (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993). G. 
R. Collins, “Excellence and ethics in counseling,” in Resources for Christian Counseling: Vol. 30, ed. G. R. Collins (Waco, TX: 
Word).  R Osmo and R. Landau, “Religious and Secular Belief Systems in Social Work: A Survey of Israeli Social Work 
Professionals,” Families in Society 84 (2003): 359-366. 
2 S. Levicoff, Christian Counseling and the Law (Chicago: Moody Press, 1991). 
R 
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THE CONSTRUCT OF TRUTH 
 
Truth To Religious Scholars 
 
 To at least some degree, we are the products of our training. Religious scholars most often come from 
seminary training backgrounds, at least in Western traditions. Further, seminaries typically follow a philosophical 
foundation relative to epistemology and means of knowing truth.
3
 Some religious traditions, for example training for 
becoming a Jesuit priest, even require philosophy as part of the preparatory curriculum. Evangelical pre-seminary 
programs in both Bible colleges and liberal arts institutions also either require philosophy coursework, or integrate 
the background into the curriculum.
4
 Non-Western religions, in a variety of modalities, also tend to base their beliefs 
on theoretical or deeply-rooted philosophical perspectives. 
 
 Truth, from a philosopher‟s vantage point, is a theoretical matter. That is, truth is a construct to be 
understood from logical and metaphysical perspectives.
5
 From this vantage point, truth possesses universal 
properties. It possesses requisite qualities such as being consistent, rational, and universal.
6
 In this tradition, 
religious scholars tend to understand truth to be similar to that portrayed by the philosopher, only adding a 
supernatural, Deistic, or spiritual dimensions.
7
 
 
 The point I am making in this article is not to pigeon-hole how all philosophers or religious scholars 
understand truth. I completely understand the wide spectrum of beliefs and am only painting with wide brush 
strokes. What I wish to drive home is the contrast. That is, the fundamental foundations from which religious 
scholars come to understand truth is very far and different from how social scientists view this construct, as will be 
discussed subsequently. 
 
Truth To Social Scientists 
 
 In contrast to the speculative model of the philosopher/religious scholars, social scientists are empiricists. 
Social scientists are educated by the scientific method. As such, while not generally being extreme positivists, most 
social scientists have been educated in traditions where truth is known via empirical investigation.
8
 General 
psychology textbooks, for example, define psychology as the scientific study of human behavior and cognitive 
processes. While psychologists are unable to watch the mind work, research is focused on observable outcomes 
through stimulus-response [S-R] measurements.
9
  
 
Truth is known by social scientists, in this context, by placing people into control groups and experimental 
groups. Variables are held constant, with one component in an experiment manipulated at a time. Truth is held to be 
the statistically significant differences found between the controlled conditions. This scientific method is essentially 
identical to that of the hard sciences (physics, chemistry, biology, etc.), except social scientists apply the method to 
people, rather than friction, chemicals, cells, and the like.
10
 In short, social scientists are trained to think like—
scientists. As such, they understand truth in scientific terms.
11
 
 
                                                 
3 J. Sutton, The Baptist Reformation: The Conservative Resurgence in the Southern Baptist Convention (Nashville, TN: 
Broadman and Holman, 2000). 
4 N. Pearcey, Total Truth: Liberating Christianity from its Cultural Capacity (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2004). 
5 I. W. Skurnik, “Metacognition and the Illusion of Truth,” Dissertation Abstracts Internationsl 59 (1998), 2489B. 
6 M. Hocutt, “Some Truths About Truth,” Behavior & Philosophy 22 (1994): 1-5. 
7 M. DeKesel, “Truth as Formal Catholicism on Alain Badiou, Saint-Paul: La Foundation De L‟Universalisme,” Communication 
& Cognition 37 (2004): 3-4. 
8 M. L. Knapp and W. J. Earnest, “Shall Ye Know The Truth? Student Odysseys in Truth-Seeking,” Communication Education 
49 (2000): 375-386. 
9 M. Hunt, The Story of Psychology (New York: Doubleday, 1993). 
10 D. A. Bernstein, L. A. Penner, A. Clarke-Stewart, and E. J. Roy, Psychology 7th ed..(New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2005). 
11 M. Montero, “On the Construction of Reality and Truth. Towards and Epistemology of Community Social Psychology,” 
American Journal of Community Psychology 30 (2002):571-584. 
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Social scientists also conduct research using qualitative research. This includes methods such as participant 
observation, in-depth interviews, and collecting field notes. Such ethnomethodologies differ from the scientific 
method, but share the same fundamental core. Namely, they are empirical methods.
12
 Social scientists conducting 
research generate conclusions inductively, reporting truth in terms of what they observed in studying the people 
groups under observation.
13
  
 
The Clash In Perspectives 
 
 In light of the above perspectives, religious scholars and social scientists clash since truth is seen as 
absolute or relative. That is, religious scholars generally believe that truth is knowable. Moses may have come down 
with two tables of stone, or Mohammad may have scribed a holy writ, or Joseph Smith may have penned divine 
words through God-given glasses. But in some manner, a body of truth exists that was provided outside of normal 
human ken.
14
 
 
 This supernatural revelation of truth will be interpreted in philosophical perspectives by most religious 
scholars.
15
 That is, consistent with the philosophers‟ perspectives, if truth is revealed by a Holy One, then it will 
possess qualities such as universality, consistency, and rationality. It will not be truth today and then tomorrow or 
some other day cease to be truth.
16
 
 
 For the social scientist, in contrast, truth generally is thought of as being relative.
17
 There is no knowledge 
outside of that which can be observed or measured. To social scientists, science (not religion) determines truth.
18
 
Moreover, what science today considers to be truth may change as new data is generated and old findings are shown 
to be invalid. There is no problem for social scientists understanding truth in this manner. Society and people change 
over time. Consequently, what truth was discovered at a given point in time is considered valid for that occasion. As 
people change, then scientists will observe and record those changes—and truth will change accordingly. In other 
words, social science truths shift as people shift in their behaviors and measurable reactions.
19
 
 
 In sum, religious scholars and social scientists may use the same nomenclature at times when discussing the 
construct of truth, but in reality, they possess divergent understandings on the matter. This is important because truth 
is the basis for building an ethical framework. If a Holy Being revealed a principle that should be understood as 
authentic, then right behavior (ethics) should be consistent with this truth. However, to the social scientist there is no 
universal reality.
20
 Truth is understood in social contexts, depending on patterns observed by clusters of shared 
culture groups. Truth to one cultural group may legitimately differ from truth to another group—even those 
respective truths are mutually exclusive to the other.
21
 
 
 If divergent notions of truths were where the issue ended, then there likely would be no significant clashes 
between religious scholars and social scientists. There would be debates, for sure, and much intellectual dialogue 
would no doubt occur. However, the real clashes occur since both religious scholars and social scientists wish to 
                                                 
12 M. R. Stafford and T. F Stafford, “Participant Observation and the Pursuit of Truth: Methodological and Ethical 
Considerations,” Journal of the Market Research Society 35 (1993): 63-76. 
13 J. R. Cutcliffe and H. P. McKenna, “When Do We Know That We Know? Considering The Truth of Research Findings and 
the Craft of Qualitative Research,” International Journal of Nursing Studies 39 (2002): 611-618. 
14 F. English, “The Human Quest for Truth,” Transactional Analysis Journal 24 (1994): 291-292. 
15 P. A. Hicks, “Truth,” in New Dictionary of Christian Ethics and Pastoral Theology, eds. D. J. Atkinson, D. F. Field, A. Holms, 
and O. O‟Donovan (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1995),  867-868. 
16 F. E. Payne, Jr., Biblical/Medical Ethics: The Christian and the Practice of Medicine (Milford, MI: Mott Media, 1985). 
17 J. L. R. Chandler, Complexity IX. Closure Over the Organization of a Scientific Truth (New York: NY Academy of Sciences, 
2000).  E. R. Wallace IV, “What is „Truth‟? Some Philosophical Contributions to Psychiatric Issues,” The American Journal of 
Psychiatry 145 (1988): 137-147. 
18 K. J. Gergen, “Psychological Science in a Postmodern Context,” American Psychologist 56 (2001): 803-813. 
19 B. D. Haig, “Truth, Method, and Postmodern Psychology,” American Psychologist 57 (2002): 457-458. 
20 D. Davidson, “Truth,” International Journal of Psychoanalysis 85 (2004): 1125-1230. 
21 M. Hocutt, “Truth, Knowledge, and Belief: A Reply to Markham,” Behavior and Philosophy 23 (1995): 79-80.  M. R. 
Markham, “Truth, Philosophy, and Behavioral Science: A Reply to Hocutt,” Behavior & Philosophy 23 (1995): 73-77. 
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influence human behavior.
22
 Life is regulated. Whose perspectives dominate the rules and laws of society? For 
centuries, the religious scholars‟ perspectives provided the template for ethical decisions in courts, legislatures, and 
professional codes. The winds of time have changed direction, however, at least in Western civilization. 
Consequently, the stage is set for the next discussion—based on what I presented to this point regarding truth—as 
both sides address human behavior and establish ethics codes. The clash will occur, in part, because both sides lack 
a solid shared foundation for overlapping epistemological understandings. 
 
CONSTRUCT OF ETHICS 
 
Ethics To Religious Scholars 
 
 Religious scholars tend to view ethics in terms of moral rightness and moral wrongness.
23
 As such, people 
are thought of as possessing internal computer chips (if you will) that have pre-programmed instructions about 
righteousness. The instructions etched inside the chips contain instructions for people to engage in certain behaviors 
and to refrain from other behaviors. Religious scholars, by and large, would argue that these directives were placed 
there, directly or indirectly, by a Supernatural Being. And the codes used for these instructions are consistent with 
the Being‟s revelation regarding truth. 
 
 As a concrete example, take adultery. A Roman Catholic Bishop might say that a client and therapist 
should not commit adultery. It is immoral to do so. In light of the truth principles revealed by God in the Bible, 
engaging in such behavior is inconsistent with the internal programmed instructions (guilt results) and forbidden by 
the religious code of ethics. This matter of truth is universal and should be consistent across all cultures. As such, it 
is not the context of the therapist/client relationship which makes the behavior wrong. It breaches ethics because the 
action violates truth and it is morally wrong. 
 
 When religious scholars speak of ethics, generally they refer to the rightness or wrongness of societal or 
personal decisions. For example, they discuss the ethics of euthanasia, the ethics of abortion, the ethics of genocide, 
the ethics of birth control, and so on. The context tends to be the overall morality of the matters.
24
 How should truth, 
as revealed by a Supreme Being, best be applied in regulating—or in establishing ethical rules—the actions of 
society? Select a random set of conferences, books, journal articles, or the like in the circles of religious scholars. 
Most will address moral qualities of behavior, philosophically addressed, when referring to ethics. 
 
Ethics To The Social Scientist 
 
 Ethics to the social scientist is of a qualitatively different nature. Social scientists are concerned with self-
governing rules for themselves as a profession.
25
 Whether Confucius revealed truth about the moral appropriateness 
of various actions lends no consideration to social scientists when writing an ethics code. Rather, they are concerned 
with how research shows various behaviors to affect others, either positively or negatively.
26
 
 
 Consider the above example of adultery. Social scientists (e.g., counselors, social workers, marriage & 
family therapists, etc.) forbid adultery between a therapist and a client. Unlike the religious scholar who condemns it 
based on lack of moral virtue, the social scientist forbids the practice because empirical studies have found such 
actions to result in complex consequences, producing discomfort to clients. There is no universal truth involved with 
the rule. Rather the code of ethics simply reflects the nature of the data available at this time. 
 
 A few decades ago, there was no prohibition in the codes of social scientist ethics for therapists and clients 
to engage in sexual activity. Today they disallow it. However, it is entirely possible in future decades for adultery to 
                                                 
22 A. Picchioni, “Searching for Psychological Truth: Some Moral and Philosophical Problems,” TCA Journal 23 (1995): 28-40. 
23 J. E. Hare, “History of Christian Ethics,” in New Dictionary of Christian Ethics and Pastoral Theology,  eds. D. J. Atkinson, D. 
F. Field, A Holmes, and O. O‟Donovan (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1995): 33-42. 
24 S. B. Rae, Moral Choices: An Introduction to Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1995). 
25 B. S. Anderson, The Counselor and the Law, 4th ed (Alexandria, VA: ACA, 1996). . 
26 R. H. Stein, Ethical Issues in Counseling (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1990). 
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again become completely acceptable in therapy. As society changes, peoples‟ mores change and the reactions that 
clients viscerally experience as a result of sexual practices may result in an alteration of the ethics code. Also, it is 
entirely possible that social scientists in non-American cultures where sexual behavior is more open may choose not 
to forbid such practices. This variability simply reflects the cultural experiences empirically observed and measured 
by the social scientists. Unlike the religious scholars, there is no absolute truth that should be applied universally to 
all social scientists.
27
  
 
 In sum, social scientists understand ethics in terms of a set of rules that a group of people make (governing 
bodies) to which all members of the group are expected to obey. Failure to obey these rules results in expulsion from 
the group, and perhaps legal consequences. Ethics, in principle, have no organic connection with morality other than 
a clinician‟s desire for possessing virtuous characteristics.28 Select a random set of conferences, books, journal 
articles, or the like in the circles of social science ethics. Most will address rules by which professionals must abide 
in order to avoid measurable, unpleasant reactions of clients. They have little connection with what philosophers or 
religious scholars would consider to be classical ethics. 
 
The Clash In Perspectives  
 
 At various points, the worlds of religious scholars and social scientists intercept. When such overlap occurs 
on the topic of ethics, friction sometimes results.
29
 While reasons for such conflict are wide and varied, with no one 
etiology, I purport that sometimes it is due to unshared values relative to the construct of ethics (and the 
underpinnings of truth). 
 
 Sometimes this discord occurs because social science ethics codes do not contain prohibitions that religious 
scholars believe should be embedded into such rules.
30
 For example, the American Counseling Association permits 
sexual relations between former therapists/clients two years after the termination of therapy (with stipulations). 
Religious scholars view this as sanctioning immoral behavior. They say that adultery is wrong in all contexts, since 
a Divine Being revealed truth in this regard. On other occasions, religious scholars complain that social science 
ethics codes forbid behavior that should be considered [morally] ethical.
31
 For example, the American Association 
of Marriage & Family Therapists forbids connection with a present or former client outside of the office therapeutic 
context. Religious scholars indicate that such fellowship is part of normal spiritual relationships and aides in 
emotional healing. Evangelical Christians such as Tan
32
 and Kellemen
33
 claim that what the AAMFT considers 
unethical due to dual relationships, the Bible deems to be living a healthy Christian life. 
 
 On the flip side, sometimes rubs occur between religious scholars and social scientists because the latter 
objects to the ethical teachings of the former. For example, many religious scholars consider homosexuality to be 
sin,
34
 whereas the social science ethics codes forbid discrimination based on sexual orientation. In addition, social 
scientists sometimes react negatively when religious scholars teach permissive activity when it is condemned by 
                                                 
27 R. Abbinnett, Truth and Social Science: From Hegel to Deconstruction (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1998).  M. A. Casper, 
“Conceptualizing truth: Philosophical implications of the Cognitive Linguistic Theory of Metaphor,” Dissertation Abstracts 
International 61 (2001): 4801A. 
28 G. P. Koocher and P. Keith-Spiegel, Ethics in Psychology: Professional Standards and Cases, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1998). 
29 G. Ohlschlager and P. Mosgofian, “Law for the Christian Counselor: A Guidebook for Clinicians and Pastors: 6,  in 
Contemporary Christian Counseling, ed. G. R. Collins (Waco, TX: Word, 1992). 
30 A. C. Tjeltveit, “Psychotherapy and Christian Ethics,” in Christian Counseling Ethics: A Handbook for Therapists, Pastors and 
Counselors,ed. R. K. Sanders (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press), 25-40. 
31 O. Zur, “The Dumbing Down of Psychology: Faulty Beliefs About Boundary Crossings and Dual Relationships,” in 
Destructive Trends in Mental Health: The Well-Intentioned Path to Harm, eds. R. H. Wright and N. A. Cummings (New York: 
Routledge, 2005), 253-282. 
32 S. Tan, Lay Counseling: Equipping Christians for a Helping Ministry (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1991). 
33 R. W. Kellemen, Spiritual Friends: A Methodology of Soul Care and Spiritual Direction (Taneytown, MD: RPM Books, 
2004). 
34 G. R. Collins, Family Shock: Keeping Families Strong in the Midst of Earthshaking Change (Wheaton, IL: Tyndale House, 
1995). 
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social scientists as being unethical. For example, many religious groups actively permit spanking of children
35
 but 
the National Association of Social Workers disfavors such activity and for social workers to do so in their 
professional positions is unethical. 
 
 What occurs, then, are situations where morality and ethics may be at odds for religious scholars and social 
scientists? Some will consider various activities to be immoral, but ethical (e.g., sex with a client after two years 
have expired). In other situations, behavior may be moral, but unethical (e.g., dual relationships with a client). The 
situation is complex to begin with, but it is sometimes exacerbated when religious scholars attempt interaction with 
one another on these issues—and they do so from completely different frames of references (e.g., no shared basis for 
truth). Even further problems occur when the two factions use the same English terminology (e.g., the word ethics) 
but do so with very different denotations. 
 
TOWARDS REMEDIATION OF THE CLASHES 
 
 Following are four consideration points for both religious scholars and social scientists toward remediation 
of the clashes that sometimes occur regarding the nature of ethics. First, do not assume meanings. Given the material 
discussed above, both religious scholars and social scientists need to minimize the number of suppositions that they 
bring to dialogue. When I speak to an American adult citizen using the English language, there are certain matters 
that I naturally assume. In other words, we seldom begin with blank slates when communicating with others. It is 
normal course of the communication process to make particular assumptions when engaging others in interaction. 
 
 In this matter, however, I suggest that religious scholars and social scientists attempt to keep the 
assumptions to a minimum. Beyond semantics, the two groups of people have different philosophies that undergird 
how they come to think and understand the concept of ethics. Therefore, before making statements—both sides 
should not assume that the other will share these same foundations—and try crafting careful statements that do not 
presuppose the other party comes from the same perspective. 
 
 Second, both religious scholars and social scientists must define meanings when communicating. 
Semantics are important for all effective communication. This is true with both denotation and connotation. Given 
the divergent backgrounds of religious scholars and social scientists, however, this is particularly salient for 
members of these two groups. Begin with the fact that the word ethics simply does not have the same meaning when 
read by differing populations.
36
 The same is also the case for the word truth.
37
  
 
 Sometimes when social scientists speak of truth, for example, what they really mean is factual data.
38
 That 
is, at the time of writing what is stated is believed to be factual. Using this terminology can make the statement 
much more palatable to the philosopher/religious scholar. The word “fact” does not tend to conjure-up notions such 
as universality, consistency, or rationality—as often does the word “truth.” It does not take much effort to use word 
substitutions, and at times, the efforts can be quite valuable when mutual communication results. 
 
 Likewise, when religious scholars speak of truth to social scientists, sometimes they might substitute terms 
such as belief, dogma, or revelation. The social scientist may better receive these concepts as apt in the context of 
religious discussion. Using the term truth, apart from empirical validation or corroboration, may sometimes only 
bring up unneeded defenses or arguments. 
 
 In short, sometimes religious scholars and social scientists may need to translate (so to speak) the ideas 
they are attempting to communicate into the language best understood by the recipient—even if that language is 
foreign to the speaker. This is particularly essential when using the term ethics. Religious scholars are advised to use 
synonyms such as morality, mores, or values. This portrays the principled undergirding of the construct. Likewise, 
                                                 
35 J. C. Dobson, The New Dare to Discipline (Wheaton, IL: Tyndale House, 1992). 
36 G. Corey, M. S. Corey, and P. Callanan, Issues and Ethics in the Helping Professions, 5th ed .(Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole, 
1998). 
37 E. Hautala, “Searching for Truth,” Etc.. 39 (1982): 372-376. 
38 M. Hocutt, “Some Truths About Truth,” Behavior & Philosophy 22 (1994): 1-5. 
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social scientists may better use words such as rules, policies, or codes rather than the term ethics. These better 
portray the fluid nature of social science ethics and that they are man-made guides which are intended to change 
over time. 
 
 Third, religious scholars need to think on levels-of-understanding when communicating with one another 
regarding the construct of ethics. Linear thinking assumes that all ideas exist horizontally and one idea must 
consequently lead to another in a logical fashion. All facets of the discussion must be consistent and without 
contradiction. However, I propose that religious scholars and social scientists must avoid this type of conversation 
when communicating about ethics.  
 
 Rather, they need to understand that concepts can be understood from multiple perspectives, depending on 
the assumptions of the communicator. When religious scholars, for example, reference the Dali Lama or another 
religious leader, there may be levels of messages embedded into the communication. For example, the social 
scientist may not accept the Dali Lama‟s theology, but may find some of his religious statements to be factually 
accurate (truthful). Thus, is the Dali Lama speaking truth??!! The question must be answered on multiple levels, and 
attempts at portraying a reply to the question on a linear plane only would be imprudent. 
 
 As mentioned previously, behavior can be understood as ethical, but immoral; and it sometimes can be 
immoral, but ethical. Consequently, black-and-white thinking causes more communication problems than necessary 
when religious scholars and social scientists interact. Sometimes, obviously, behaviors also can be ethical and moral. 
The point is that the two groups need to understand that there is not one set of principles or guidelines that they both 
share when communicating about ethics. Both sides need to think deeply and see the complexities involved with 
ethical discussions. Before making judgments, both sides need to try and examine all potential angles of the matter 
at hand, realizing that truth sometimes may be contradictory, may not always be consistent, and may not be 
universal—if understood differently from the traditional philosophical meanings of the concept—and the same is 
true with ethical principles and codes. 
 
 Fourth, I suggest that in order for religious scholars and social scientists better to connect, they need to 
exercise mutual respect. This can be more difficult to accomplish, in reality, than the simple logic of the statement 
might imply. Everyone likes to be right. Further, intellectual strongholds are deeply embedded into how both 
religious scholars and social scientists think. If graduate education is successful, then members of both groups will 
possess pathos for how they understand respective constructs. Giving-up comfortable cognitive sets that intuitively 
make sense and with which one communicates to colleagues regularly is more difficult to do than what might at first 
be apparent. 
 
 Natural desires are for the members of the other group to convert their lingo to our own. However, with 
both sides digging-in little genuine communication or dialogue likely will occur. Mutual respect requires that both 
religious scholars and social scientists work at phenomenologically viewing one another‟s worlds. I purport that 
neither side has the complete and total correct perspective regarding the construct of ethics. There are kernels of 
truth in both camps. In one sense, there is no new conflict occurring. The core ideas of Plato (philosophy/religious 
scholars) and Aristotle (empirical social scientists) are in vogue. In that sense, resolution between religious scholars 
and social scientists likely will not occur any time soon. However, the debate presently is playing itself out with 
high-stakes-consequences relative to the lives of people who practice religion and those served by social scientists. 
 
Advanced progress between these two professional worlds will require more than mere semantical 
translations when communicating to one another. Rather, it will take a spirit of genuinely wanting to understand the 
other side—then respectfully assessing the others‟ views from their vantage points—and looking for points of 
natural connection. Not only is this possible between intelligent and reasonable professionals, it is also necessary. 
The persons served both by religious practitioners and by social scientists deserve the greater good that comes from 
cooperation—not antagonism—by their intellectual leaders. I believe that understanding the concepts outlined in the 
present article, followed by a spirit of desired collaboration will reduce tensions, avoid collisions, and move toward 
better working alliances. 
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